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When the flood waters recede, the poor folk along the river
start from scratch.
— Richard Wright1
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gratitude to Professors David Dante Troutt, Tuan Samahon, Sylvia Lazos, D. Aaron Lacy,
Joel Mintz, Kathy Cerminara, Kimberly Hausbeck, and Tom I. Romero, II for their help on
earlier drafts. I am very grateful to Katherine Gonzalez, Sanaz Alempour, Nicholas Seidule,
Joshua Landsman, and Matthew Benzion for research assistance. Special thanks to Cai,
Christian, and Chris.
1. RICHARD WRIGHT, The Man Who Saw the Flood, in EIGHT MEN 102, 110 (Thunder
Mouth’s Press 1987).
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is called hurricane roulette.2 And for many, participation in
the game is a badge of honor signaling a willingness to “ride out
the storm” in a designated hurricane zone, rather than seek refuge
by moving to safer ground.3 That is risky, indeed. But even such
grave risks are minimal compared with the high stakes facing hurricane survivors that are counting on government assistance to
help them rebuild after the storm.
Three years after the flood waters of Hurricane Katrina have
receded, the rebuilding efforts for many of those displaced by the
storm continue to paralyze the region and prevent meaningful relief. Not only has public housing been “cleaned up” in New Orleans, it has been virtually eliminated.4 The rental housing market
is marked by staggering rent increases,5 rampant discrimination,6
and biased restrictions.7 Even the temporary shelters available for
displaced people—trailers issued by the Federal Emergency Man2. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA 114 (2006) [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE], available at

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/Katrinareport/mainreport.pdf. According to government officials,
ten to twenty-five percent of people who live in a hurricane evacuation zone will not evacuate; they stay and take the chance that the hurricane will either hit somewhere else or
that they will be lucky and relatively unaffected by the storm. Id. at 114. This statistic does
not apply to the poor, sick, or elderly who are unable to evacuate because of immobility or to
those who are not properly informed as to the risks presented by the storm.
3. During Hurricane Katrina, some of the informed, healthy, and capable people who
made the personal decision that they did not want to leave “were gamblers, long ago courting risk like a lover.” DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE 62 (2006). Brinkley points
out that Good Samaritans, adrenaline junkies, squatters, and faith-followers convinced by
parochial pride stay put. Id. As a life-long Floridian, I confess to having elected to “ride out”
several hurricanes myself. After Katrina, of course, I am more reluctant than ever to adopt
this approach for serious storms.
4. See generally James C. Smith, Disaster Planning and Public Housing: Lessons
Learned from Katrina (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing
background information on the condition of public housing in New Orleans).
5. Susan Saulny & Gary Rivlin, Renewal Money Bypasses Renters in New Orleans,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at 14; BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, THE ROAD HOME
RENTAL HOUSING PROGRAM: CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS 2 (2006) [hereinafter THE ROAD
HOME], available at http://www.bgr.org/pdf/reports/Consequences_for_N.O_._091506_.pdf (“Average rents have risen by 25% to 30% across the metropolitan area, creating problems for moderate
as well as low income families.”).
6. One study revealed that “[b]lack residents encountered discrimination nearly six
times out of ten when apartment hunting in the New Orleans area post-Katrina.” Gwen
Filosa, Bias is Found in Rental Market, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 25, 2007, at 1, available
at http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-8/1177482229124760.xml&
coll=1&thispage=1.
7. See Billy Sothern, A Question of Blood, The Nation, Mar. 27, 2007,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070409/sothern; see generally Olympia Duhart & Eloisa C.
Rodriguez-Dod, Legislation and Criminalization Impacting Renters Displaced by Katrina, in
LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 141 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009)
(discussing consanguinity ordinance in St. Bernard Parish enacted following Katrina).
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agement Agency (FEMA)—have been saddled with their own set of
dangers.8 The systemic administrative and legislative failures following the storm literally changed the face of New Orleans.9 More
importantly, the city remains in ruins, standing as proof of the
government’s breach of America’s social contract.10
This Article uses the difficulties and dangers surrounding the
FEMA trailers to examine whether disasters such as Katrina
should compel us to re-imagine the proper role of government intervention in response to harms. The Article examines the responsibilities of the government to the survivors of a hurricane and
how those responsibilities should be reconfigured in the disasterprone.11 Though Hurricane Katrina is a distant memory for some,
the constant threat of hurricanes in the southeast region (such as
Hurricane Gustav in August 2008) confirms that these issues re8. See Spencer S. Hsu, FEMA Knew of Toxic Gas in Trailers; Hurricane Victims Reported Illnesses, WASH. POST, July 20, 2007, at A01.
9. The city is now whiter and wealthier, quite removed from the community that
once defined “The Big Easy.” Rick Lyman, Reports Reveal Hurricanes’ Impact on Human
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A16. The Census Bureau’s first study of Gulf Coast
areas hit by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, released in June, 2006, showed that New Orleans
emerged sixty-four percent smaller. Id. The report found that “[t]hose who remained in the
city were significantly more likely to be white, slightly older, and a bit more well off . . . .”
Id. The bureau reports were the first to measure the demographic, social, and financial impact of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Id.; see, e.g., WILLIAM H. FREY, AUDREY SINGER & DAVID
PARK, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, RESETTLING NEW ORLEANS: THE FIRST FULL PICTURE
FROM THE CENSUS (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/
2007/07katrinafreysinger/20070912_katrinafreysinger.pdf.
10. See Michael Ignatieff, The Broken Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at 15; see
also MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER, HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE
COLOR OF DISASTERS 13 (2006) (discussing Ignatieff’s argument); David Dante Troutt, Remarks at the Black History Month Observances at the Community Church of New York
City (Feb. 10, 2008), available at http://daviddantetroutt.com/speech1d.html (“Political partisanship in the form of a Republican president responsible for the rescue of black residents
of a Democratic city joined with structural racism and economic marginalization to reveal
the erosion of the American social contract.”).
11. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientists, charged by
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme
with developing an authoritative statement on climate change, found in its 2007 report that
several ecological systems were being affected by climate change springing from human
activities. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12-14 (2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. Further,
many experts have agreed that climatological changes have made the threat of natural disasters more likely in today’s world. See generally High-Level Conference on Food Security:
The Challenges of Climate Change & Bioenergy, Rome, Italy, June 3-5, 2008, Climate
Change Bioengery and Food Security: Civil Society and Private Sector Perspectives, 1-2, Doc.
HLC/08/INF/6 (addressing concerns that the warming of the climate has increased hydrometeorlogical hazards); see also Joel Mintz, Climate Change and Presidential Leadership, 39
ENVTL. LAW REP. 10045, 10045-47 (2009) (asserting global climate disruption and the objective case for concern). But see Peter Ferrara, Baby, Baby It’s a Cold World: Explaining Global
Warming to Congress, National Review Online, June 2, 2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/
?q=ZGQ3N2NlNmJjOGFlNDNiNTEzOGY5MjVhY2ZiNGYwNjk=%20%20 (arguing that the
global warming “hysteria” is a political construct that is more related to class struggle than
climate or science).
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main a day-to-day struggle for many.12 In fact, the proliferation of
natural disasters in the current era makes the safety measures
and remedies available for government-issued temporary housing
even more relevant.13 But has the housing assistance available for
hurricane survivors improved much?14 Presently, it is nearly impossible for government inaction in this arena to trigger any protected recognized rights. The few Katrina survivors who received
aid are entirely dependent on the government’s conferral of discretionary benefits.15 They are subject to the whims and monumental
failures of bureaucracy.16 Part II of this Article briefly summarizes
the housing challenges that persist in New Orleans because of
Hurricane Katrina and contextualizes the needs for safe shelter.
Part III traces failures of government accountability through an
examination of the administrative failures surrounding the socalled “toxic trailers.” This part details the dangers surrounding
the toxicity levels in the trailers issued to Katrina survivors by
FEMA and identifies the problems presented by the distribution of
the trailers. Part IV reviews the inefficacy of the remedial response
to the disaster relief and tracks litigation challenges. Part V pro12. On September 1, 2008, Hurricane Gustav struck the New Orleans region as a
Category 2 storm. Editorial, Hurricane Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2008, at A22.
13. See Duhart & Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 7; see also NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK
DOCTRINE 410 (2007) (noting that climate scientists have directly linked increase hurricane
intensity and frequency to rises in ocean temperature).
14. In sharp contrast to evacuation failures with Hurricane Katrina, it was evident
from the start that the evacuation measures in place for residents in need during Hurricane
Gustav were a huge improvement from those failures connected to Hurricane Katrina in
2005. See Jeff Hecht, New Orleans Passes Easy Hurricane Test, NewScientist, Sept. 2,
2008,
http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/hurricane-season/dn14649-whygustav-was-no-katrina.html. Before Gustav, contra-flow measures were in place and evacuation plans for almost two million people were being faithfully carried out. Paulo Prada,
Alex Roth & Jeff D. Opdyke, Weakened Hurricane Hits Louisiana, Grazes Oil Patch, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 2, 2008, at A1. In sharp contrast, both local and federal failures complicated
and delayed effective evacuations during Hurricane Katrina. See Olympia Duhart, Blowing
the Lid Off: Expanding the Due Process Clause to Defend the Defenseless Against Hurricane
Katrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 411, 427-30, 433-37 (2007).
15. The September 11th (“9/11”) Victim Compensation Fund has no corollary in the
Gulf Coast. See DANIEL FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND
BEYOND 317-19 (2006). Professor Farber argues in support of a fund to support Katrina
victims in light of the federal government’s role in the flooding and the disadvantaged status of most victims. Id.; see also Mitchell F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches
in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 329 (2006) (advocating the creation of a Katrina Fund modeled after the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund to
give financial relief to Katrina-affected residential homeowners to help close the gap between damages and insurable residential property losses). Professor Crusto asserts that the
creation of the Katrina Fund would not only provide an opportunity for federal and state
government to “redeem themselves” but would also stave off “Katrina’s second coming[—a
flood of] bankruptcies, foreclosures and homelessness.” Id. at 372-73.
16. See David Dante Troutt, Many Thousands Gone, Again, in AFTER THE STORM 3, 20
(David Dante Troutt ed., 2006). (“Without their own city and state to protect them, they
have become pinballs in a FEMA game of rotating hotel evictions.”). Professor Troutt notes
that survivors were given multiple conflicting reports about the end of housing vouchers. Id.
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poses a remedy to address the gap in relief offered for trailer residents; specifically, applying the factors that led to the creation of
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund.17 This Article proposes the
establishment of a Toxic Trailer Fund to assist Katrina survivors
who weathered first a storm, then a slew of government failures.
Finally, this Article raises and refutes potential counterarguments
to the establishment of a fund to assist this discrete class of
storm survivors.
II. THE STORM AND ITS AFTERMATH—PERSISTENT
HOUSING CHALLENGES
In the early summer of 2005, before “Katrina” meant anything
to the National Hurricane Center,18 New Orleans grappled with
more than its fair share of problems. The city was besieged with
crime, poverty, and an inadequate public education system.19 Despite these shortcomings, New Orleans continued to maintain an
appeal and culture uniquely its own. One writer observed that, despite its troubles, New Orleans “had a lot more civic life than most
of the United States.”20 It was a unique American city with a rich
tradition and a bevy of life-long residents with strong roots in
the community.21
Then the storm came. By all accounts a seminal event in American history, Hurricane Katrina took more than 1,550 lives22 and
displaced up to 250,000 people.23 The storm struck areas through17. The full name for the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund is the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-42, § 1, 115 Stat. 230, 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 4010140129 (2006)).
18. “Unlike New Orleans’s hurricane evacuation strategy, tracking hurricanes was the responsibility of the federal government.” BRINKLEY, supra note 3, at 62 (emphasis in original).
19. See DYSON, supra note 10, 1-12. Before the storm, New Orleans had a poverty rate
of twenty-three percent, a figure seventy-six percent higher than the national average. Id.
at 5-6. New Orleans has a forty percent illiteracy rate. Id. at 8.
20. Rebecca Solnit, The Lower Ninth Battles Back, THE NATION, Sept. 10, 2007, at 13.
Solnit cites the sense of community fostered by social clubs, churches, crawfish boils, and
extended families. Id.
21. Writer Mike Tidwell offers his analysis of the strong appeal of the region: “In my
estimation, the Cajun Bayou region of Louisiana, at least before Katrina, was the most distinctive and culturally rich region in America.” Eric Kancler, Bayou Farwell, Mother Jones,
Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2005/10/bayou-farewell.
22. Prada, Roth & Opdyke, supra note 14; see also Editorial, Deaths of Out-of-State
Evacuees Raise Katrina Toll, WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at A2. The death toll includes
deaths that are related to the storm or its aftermath. See Editorial, Evacuee Deaths Increase
Katrina’s Louisiana Toll, ORLANDO SENT., May 20, 2006, at A14.
23. ALEX GRAUMANN ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., HURRICANE KATRINA: A CLIMATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2005), available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. The storm ultimately impacted 1.5 million people. FEMA’s Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 59 (2006) (statement of Richard L.
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out Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana,24 with Louisiana suffering the hardest blows.25 Following Katrina, poor people and people
of color have been priced out of the area’s redevelopment.26 This
dramatic shift in demographics signals both the demise of a distinct
black American subculture27 and an absolute crisis in an already
troubled affordable housing market.28 “The scope of physical destruction of homes caused by Katrina has not been experienced in
the United States since the Civil War. Nearly a million homes were
damaged; a third of them were destroyed or damaged severely.”29
According to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, the
residents of more than seventy percent of the most severely damaged homes were low income families.30 Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, and the related levee breaks of 2005, destroyed—or nearly
destroyed—82,000 rental units in Southeast Louisiana.31 About
sixty-three percent of these units were located in New Orleans.32
Moreover, the post-Katrina affordable housing crisis is emblematic
of the urban inequality that pervades America.33 Human rights
lawyer William Quigley notes that New Orleans is but one sign of
changes throughout the country:
What is happening in New Orleans is just a more concentrated, more graphic version of what is going on all over our
country. Every city in our country has some serious similarities to New Orleans. Every city has some abandoned
neighborhoods. Every city in our country has abandoned
Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) [hereinafter FEMA’s
Manufactured Housing Program].
24. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 103.
25. See FEMA’s Manufactured Housing Program, supra note 23, at 59. More than one
thousand people perished in Louisiana alone. Id.
26. Lyman, supra note 9; see also FREY, SINGER & PARK, supra note 9, at 1.
27. Editorial, New Orleans Fights for Its Character, Reuters, Jan. 14, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16624152/.
28. See National Low Income Housing Coalition, Testimony of President of NLIHC to
Ad Hoc Subcommittee, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=4132
[hereinafter Crowley testimony]; see also Marcia Johnson, Addressing Housing Needs in the
Post Katrina Gulf Coast, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 327, 328 (2005-06) (“[T]he regions hardest
hit by Katrina were already suffering significant housing shortages coupled with limited
capital to sustain a good quality of life.”).
29 . Crowley testimony, supra note 28.
30. Id.; see also Associated Press, Katrina’s Victims Poorer than U.S. Average, Fox
News, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168500,00.html. For example,
prior to Katrina, housing expenditures for almost half of the renters in New Orleans exceeded thirty percent of the household income—“the federal benchmark for determining if a
renter’s housing expenditures are burdensome.” THE ROAD HOME, supra note 5, at 2.
31. THE ROAD HOME, supra note 5, at 1.
32. Id.
33. See generally David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 427 (2000).

Spring, 2009]

TOXIC KATRINA TRAILERS

259

some public education, public housing, public healthcare,
and criminal justice. Those who do not support public education, healthcare, and housing will continue to turn all of our
country into the Lower Ninth Ward unless we stop them.34
Since Katrina is representative of government failures, its value as a model should not be overlooked as we seek to set higher
standards for government response.
III. GOVERNMENT FAILURES AND TOXIC TRAILERS
The scope of government neglect in post-Katrina New Orleans,
particularly the abysmal federal response, may be measured by
the systemic administrative shortcomings of FEMA.35 FEMA was
established through a 1979 Executive Order, which created what
was a cabinet-level agency that reported directly to the President.36 Even in its nascent period, FEMA showed signs of fragmentation and limitation. One person involved in the reorganization of
the agency said it was like making a cake “by mixing the milk still
in the bottle, with the flour still in the sack, with the eggs still in
their carton.”37
Administrative fragmentation and a lack of priority for natural
hazard—including floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes—troubled
FEMA throughout the 1980s and 1990s.38 Furthermore, the advent
of terror shifted FEMA priorities away from natural disasters.39
Once President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act in 2002,
the federal reorganization placed FEMA squarely under the um-

34. KLEIN, supra note 13, at 421; see also William P. Quigley, What Katrina Revealed,
2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2008) (using narratives of Katrina survivors to advance seven
key lessons for social justice).
35. FEMA has since become synonymous for the epic recovery failures of Hurricane
Katrina. The agency has been subjected to scathing Congressional reports, public censures
and media lashings. See Editorial, Stonewalling the Katrina Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2005, at A20 (“The recovery effort has been subject to blistering criticism from conservative,
nonpartisan and liberal groups alike.”).
36. FEMA History, http://www.fema.gov/about/history) (last visited June 13, 2009).
37. MITCHELL L. MOSS & CHARLES SHELHAMER, THE CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, THE STAFFORD ACT: PRIORITIES FOR REFORM 11 (2007), available
at
http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/pubs/Report_StaffordActReform_MitchellMoss_10.03.07.pdf.
The cake metaphor refers to the efforts under President Jimmy Carter to streamline the
federal agencies with whom local and state officials had to work during disaster response
periods. Id. “President Carter’s authority to create FEMA was limited, forcing him to transfer staff and procedures from existing agencies—and not creating a new, more centralized response system.” Id.; see also KLEIN, supra note 13, at 408-09 (referring to FEMA’s contemporary
efforts as a “laboratory for the Bush administration’s vision of government run by corporations”).
38. DYSON, supra note 10, at 44-45.
39. See Iris Young, Katrina: Too Much Blame, Not Enough Responsibility, DISSENT,
Winter 2006, at 44.
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brella of Homeland Security.40 After being “politicized and packed
with patronage appointments” the agency was entirely unprepared
to deal with the trouble ahead.41
Perhaps the most tangible and enduring example of FEMA’s
shortcomings is the distribution of relief homes by FEMA—the
trailer homes issued to hurricane survivors. Emergency housing
needs fall to FEMA, which has assisted in rebuilding efforts
through camp sites filled with mobile homes. Rather than being
places of refuge, the camps have emerged as sites filled with strain
and squalor. “[F]or tens of thousands of families, the Katrina crisis
never ended . . . .”42
As writer Michelle Chen has noted, “[m]any New Orleanians
see trailers as the fastest means of reestablishing themselves in
their communities.”43 More than three years after the storm, thousands of survivors are still living in “temporary” trailers. In February 2007, approximately 275,000 people were living in the travel
trailers and mobile homes that FEMA purchased after Katrina.44
FEMA reported these shelters cost more than $2.6 billion.45 At the
peak, almost 119,000 trailers were used to house hurricane survivors.46 At the start of the 2008 hurricane season, Katrina survivors
still occupied more than 15,000 trailers in the Gulf Coast region.47
40. DYSON, supra note 10, at 49; see also Chris Strohm, Collins, Lieberman Suggest
FEMA Remain as Part of DHS, CongressDaily, Mar. 8, 2006 (reviewing calls post-Katrina to
remove FEMA from the Homeland Security Department and make it an independent agency).
41. DYSON, supra note 10, at 51. At one point, FEMA had ten times the number of appointees as other agencies. MOSS & SHELLHAMER, supra note 37, at 11; see also John K.
Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA’s Failure to Provide
Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 443 (2008) (criticizing FEMA’s inability to respond to its charge to meet emergency housing needs).
42. Chris Kromm, Coordinator, Gulf Coast Reconstruction Watch, Remarks at the
Congressional Briefing “Addressing Remaining Low Income Housing Needs for Hurricane
Evacuees and for the Gulf Coast,” available at http://www.southernstudies.org/2007/
09/institutes-capitol-hill-testimony-on-27.html.
43. Michelle Chen, New Orleans’ Displaced Struggle for Housing, Jobs, Neighborhoods, NowPublic, Oct. 23, 2005, http://www.nowpublic.com/new_orleans_displaced_
struggle_for_housing_jobs_neighborhoods.
44. Amanda Spake, Dying for a Home: Toxic Trailers Are Making Katrina Refugees Ill,
THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.alternet.org/story/48004/.
45. Id. FEMA awarded Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. contracts worth more than $500 million for the production of 50,000 trailers within weeks of Hurricane Katrina. The CDC found
that Gulf Stream, Forest River, Keystone and Pilgrim (all manufacturers of travel trailers)
had manufactured significant percentages of trailers with formaldehyde levels above onehundred parts per billion, “the level at which . . . acute adverse health effects can be experienced.” COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT
ON TRAILER MANUFACTURERS AND ELEVATED FORMALDEHYDE LEVELS 1-2 (2008), available
at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080709103125.pdf.
46. Leslie Eaton, Agency Is Under Pressure to Develop Disaster Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2008, at 18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/us/13trailers.html?_
r=1&oref=.
47. Rhoda Amon, A Look Inside FEMA Housing, NEWSDAY, July 10, 2008, at A28
(“Estimates range[d] from 15,000 to 37,000.”); see also Maria Recio, House Blasts FEMA,
HUD, Lawmakers Furious About Storm Victims’ Housing, SUN HERALD, June 5, 2008, at
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These camper-like units, which cost about $15,000 each, “are
fabricated from composite wood, particle board and other materials
that emit formaldehyde.”48 The amounts emitted are dangerous.
Notably, more than 0.1 parts per million of formaldehyde in air
can cause eye, lung and nose irritation,49 and the National Toxicology Program has determined that formaldehyde may be “reasonably anticipated to be a carcinogen.”50
The Sierra Club conducted air quality tests on forty-four FEMA
trailers between April and July, 2006 finding “formaldehyde concentrations as high as 0.34 parts per million.”51 According to one
study of the chemical’s workplace effects, that formaldehyde level
is almost equal to what a professional embalmer would be exposed
to on the job.52 Among the Katrina evacuees who have called the
trailers home for the past three years, there are increased reports
A2, (estimating that as many as 22,000 Katrina victims were still living in trailers at
the time).
48. Spake, supra note 44. Emitted from pressed wood and particle board products,
formaldehyde has a long half life, remaining in indoor air in significant concentrations long
after a structure is considered “new.” See COMING ALONGSIDE, FEMA TRAILER LIVING AND
GOOD HEALTH: RECIPES FOR SUCCESS IN THE POST-KATRINA WORLD 2 (2007). “Formaldehyde
is used in hundreds of products, but particularly in the resins used to bond laminated wood
products and to bind wood chips in particleboard.” FEMA’s Toxic Trailers: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th Cong. 112-13 (2007) [hereinafter
FEMA’s Toxic Trailers Hearing] (remarks of Scott Needle, M.D., on behalf of American
Academy of Pediatrics). The American Academy of Pediatrics, concerned about the special
vulnerability of children to formaldehyde exposure, urged FEMA to study the children’s
exposure levels and steps needed to improve the health of exposed children. Id. at 4-5. The
Academy also urged FEMA to set standards for formaldehyde levels in trailers purchased by
the agency that exceed the current scientific standards to take into account the special exposure of children. Id.
49. See Healthy Child, Healthy World, Chemical Encyclopedia, http://healthychild.org/
issues/chemical-pop/formaldehyde (last visited June 13, 2009). (“Formaldehyde is a strong
smelling, volatile organic compound (VOC) and common indoor air pollutant. . . . [It] is normally present in air at low levels, usually less than 0.03 parts per million.”). A survey of
eighty-four funeral directors and apprentices with occupational exposure to formaldehyde
had the following results: embalmers reported with more frequency than control subjects
symptoms of irritation of the eyes, upper respiratory tract, and skin. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., AN UPDATE & REVISION OF AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE
REGISTRY’S FEBRUARY 2007 HEALTH CONSULTATION: FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING OF FEMA
TEMPORARY-HOUSING TRAILERS 12 (2007) [hereinafter FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING], available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/formaldehyde/pdfs/revised_formaldehyde_report
_1007.pdf. Chronic bronchitis, shortness of breath and nasal irritation were also reported at
a higher level. Id.
50. FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING, supra note 49, at 13. “While the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has ranked formaldehyde a ‘probable’ human carcinogen, the World
Health Organization recently upgraded its classification to ‘known’ concluding that formaldehyde is ‘carcinogenic to humans.’ ” Healthy Child, Healthy World, supra note 49.
51. Mike Brunker, Are FEMA Trailers ‘Toxic Tin Cans’? Private Testing Finds High
Levels of Formaldehyde; Residents Report Illnesses, MSNBC, July 25, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.com/id/14011193; see also SIERRA CLUB, TOXIC TRAILERS: TESTS REVEAL
HIGH FORMALDEHYDE LEVELS IN FEMA TRAILERS (2008), http://www.sierraclub.org/gulfcoast/
downloads/formaldehyde_test.pdf.
52. Brunker, supra note 51. OSHA limits the formaldehyde to which workers can be
exposed over an eight hour day to 0.75 parts per million. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (c)(1) (2005).
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of wheezing, coughing, headaches, lethargy, sinus infections, and
asthma attacks.53
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, an air
quality analysis of ninety-six unoccupied trailers, similar to those
distributed by FEMA to house people displaced by Hurricane Katrina, revealed that formaldehyde levels in those trailers averaged
1.04 parts per million.54 Those levels ranged between 0.01 parts
per million and 3.66 parts per million.55 The report also indicated a
positive correlation between room temperature and formaldehyde
levels.56 This is especially problematic for the warm, humid
Gulf Coast.57
Currently, no federal standards are in place to limit formaldehyde in building materials used in travel trailers and recreational
vehicles.58 However, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has set standards to limit the formaldehyde in
manufactured housing and mobile homes.59 The limit for plywood
formaldehyde emission is 0.2 parts per million.60 The HUD limit
for particleboard materials is 0.3 parts per million.61 Surprisingly,
these standards still do not apply to travel trailers used as socalled “temporary” homes for emergency relief.62 FEMA has since
set its own standard limiting formaldehyde emission to sixteen
parts per billion, but Congress has not yet taken a stance on what
the appropriate standards for materials in travel trailers should
be.63 Rather than imposing minimum production standards on tra53. See Spake, supra note 44.
54. FORMALDEHYDE SAMPLING, supra note 49, at 13-15. A health consultation
represents a response to a “specific request for information about health risks related to a
specific site, a chemical release, or the presence of hazardous materials.” Id. at 2. In July
2006, FEMA asked the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) to evaluate air sampling data collected in the trailers by the EPA. Id. at 4. Though the findings
are damning, the ATSDR relayed from the onset that the results should not be “generalized
to all FEMA trailers” or “used to predict the health consequences of living in those trailers.”
Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 15. The second part of the report examined whether ventilation in the trailers—either with open windows or air conditioning—was effective in lowering the levels of
formaldehyde; the Agency found that both interventions lowered formaldehyde levels. Id. at
15-16.
56. Id. at 16.
57. City Rating.com, Average Temperature, http://www.cityrating.com/cityweather.asp?
city=New+Orleans (last visited June 13, 2009) (reporting the average temperature for New
Orleans as 61.8 degrees Fahrenheit and noting humidity reaches over ninety percent in the
summer months).
58. Spake, supra note 44.
59. 24 C.F.R. § 3280.
60. 24 C.F.R. § 3280.308(a)(1) (2005).
61. Id. § 3280.308(a)(2).
62. Spake, supra note 44.
63. Mike Brunker, Congress Names Names in FEMA Trailer Probe: House Democrats
Say Manufacturers Knew of High Formaldehyde Levels, MSNBC, July 9, 2008,
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vel trailer manufacturers who stood to make billions of dollars on
the sale of these homes, FEMA provided virtually no oversight to
the process.64 The agency relied upon the goodwill and fortune of
the trailer home manufacturers, who were expected to selfregulate or respond to safety mandates that no one in the federal
government had bothered to mention.65 Worse, FEMA continued to
defend its use of the trailers despite findings by the Sierra Club
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in
November 2005.66
In July 2007, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform for the U.S. House of Representatives held an oversight
hearing on FEMA’s failure to respond adequately to reports of
dangerous formaldehyde in the trailers.67 Paul Stewart, a Hurricane Katrina survivor, gave the following testimony as part of his
prepared statement at the hearings:
The first night we stayed in the camper my wife woke several times with difficulty breathing and a runny nose. She
got up once and turned on the lights to discover that her
runny nose was in fact, a bloody nose. This scared the hell
out of us; we didn’t know what was causing her bloody nose,
or breathing issues and I was beginning to show symptoms
of my own, which included, burring[sic] eyes, scratchy
throat, coughing, and runny nose.
The symptoms continued for weeks and then months and finally we thought about just leaving, but at that point we
were stuck because we were still wrestling with insurance
issues, the Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, our lot was still
strewn with debris, money was in short supply, and I was
trying to hold on to my job. We just couldn’t afford to move.68
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25607578/from/ET.
64. FEMA’s Toxic Trailers Hearing, supra note 48, at 206 (remarks of R. David Paulison, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (“Given decades of successful
history of using mobile homes and smaller travel trailers to provide temporary housing, we
had no reason to anticipate problems with the habitability of travel trailer units.”).
65. Gulf Stream Coach, which collected more than $500 million and received the bulk
of FEMA trailer contracts after Katrina, maintains it should not be responsible for formaldehyde levels in the trailers because no standards existed when the trailers were made and
distributed. Brunker, supra note 63.
66. Paul Stewart, Remarks Before the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (July 19, 2007), available at http://www.toxic-trailer.com/
govinvdocs/20070719_6.pdf.
67. FEMA’s Toxic Trailers Hearing, supra note 48, at 123-29 (including testimony
from, among others, three displaced Gulf Coast hurricane victims and an industrial hygienist who testified that the limited testing performed by the Sierra Club revealed unacceptably high levels of formaldehyde).
68. Id. at 134-35 (prepared remarks of Paul Stewart).
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The testimony offered at the hearing was shocking, but consistent with the theme of governmental neglect pervasive in the Katrina narrative. The testimony revealed that monitored levels of
formaldehyde were seventy-five times higher than the recommended limit set by the National Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health.69 In the face of this information, FEMA released a
public statement discounting any risk associated with formaldehyde exposure.70 In its early stages, the agency tested only one occupied trailer to determine its formaldehyde levels.71 Furthermore,
FEMA’s Office of General Counsel denied repeated requests made
by some FEMA staff members to conduct testing.72 A House
Science subcommittee accused FEMA in January 2008 of manipulating scientific research on the formaldehyde issue to minimize
the potential danger faced by the tens of thousands of survivors.73
Rather than respond quickly to a probable cancer risk, however,
FEMA officials planned to conceal information with hopes of avoiding any possible liability.
If the toxins in the FEMA-issued trailers create profound physiological risks for hurricane survivors, the social and psychological ills that plague those same people are even more pronounced.
The FEMA-ville communities—the enclaves of trailers set apart to
provide housing to Katrina survivors—fuel the alienation that
serves as the bedrock for a host of other problems.
“[H]omelessness has doubled in New Orleans, and . . . suicide
attempts among residents of Mississippi FEMA camps have [increased] seventy-nine times over pre-disaster levels.”74 Women are
especially vulnerable to sexual assault and domestic violence at
FEMA camp sites.75 Additionally, children face special social and
psychological hurdles and are more vulnerable to physical health
risks presented by chronic exposure to formaldehyde.76 Marked
69. Id. at 155 (statement by Chairman and Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 108, 239 (revealing FEMA’s Office of General Counsel shunned testing because it would compel FEMA to take curative measures, noting that testing should be
avoided because “should [the results] indicate some problem, the clock is running on our
duty to respond to them”); see also Elizabeth Schulte, Still Left Behind: Katrina’s Forgotten
Refugees, Counterpunch, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/schulte09052007.html.
(describing the conduct of FEMA officials who “did their best to sweep their complaints under the rug”).
73. Lawmakers Fault FEMA on Trailers, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at A3.
74. Kromm, supra note 42.
75. Peggy Simpson, Women’s Media Center Katrina Campaign: New Study Explores the
Aftermath for Women, July 10, 2007, http://www.ms.foundation.org/wmspage.cfm?parm1=475
(mentioning a report by the Institute for Women’s Policy Research indicating that women
were more “vulnerable to sexual assault and domestic violence” following the storm).
76. Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Medical Management Guidelines for Formaldehyde, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/
mmg111.html#bookmark02 (last visited June 13, 2009) (noting one of the reasons for child-
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increases in psychological displacement and serious mental health
issues are also prevalent among FEMA trailer residents.77 Furthermore, the physical displacement of Hurricane Katrina survivors no doubt fuels their sense of psychological displacement. Already set apart by race and poverty, many survivors have their
“otherness” confirmed through government-sponsored exile.78 The
pervasive lack of open space and green space—for residents to talk
and play—has contributed to the psycho-social ills that besiege
Katrina survivors.79
As bad as life in the FEMA trailers has been, things may get
worse as FEMA implements plans to force thousands of families in
New Orleans, and across Louisiana, to leave their trailers.80 Since
November 2007, FEMA has been working toward closing all of the
trailer camps it runs for Hurricane Katrina survivors. 81 However,
the push for relocation did not affect people living in FEMA-issued
trailers in private trailers parks and those living in trailers in
front of their hurricane-damaged homes.82 Although FEMA failed
to meet the original May 2008 deadline for trailer closure, the federal government recently confirmed that many of the FEMA trailers were contaminated by formaldehyde and renewed its efforts to
ren’s heightened risk of repeated formaldehyde exposure is the longer latency period of the
chemical in children).
77. Interview by Dr. Lynn Lawry with Madeline Brand, National Public Radio (NPR),
on NPR (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/
Archives?p_action=doc&p_doc. The broadcast notes a study that found people living in
FEMA trailers had depression rates of seven times the national average and suicide rates of
fifteen times the state’s norms. Id.
78. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Domestic Right of Return?: Race, Rights, and Residency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
325, 351 (2007) (discussing exile and assimilation as the primary means of addressing
“otherness” in the context of Katrina survivors).
79. There is also something to be said for the series of events that led to the reliance
on the FEMA trailers in the first place. The quagmire that envelops the Katrina survivors
who live in FEMA trailers demonstrates too well the domino effect of compounded harms.
Displacement can be traced to a host of social ills including public housing policies, environmental threats, and poverty.
80. Leslie Eaton, FEMA Sets Date for Closing Katrina Trailer Camps, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/us/29trailer.htm.
81. Id. Most of the people living in FEMA trailers at that time—many of which were elderly, disable, or living alone—were jammed on playgrounds, church property, and parking
lots around Louisiana. Id. Notably, a large of these people were renters before the storm. Id. In
May 2009, FEMA renewed its call to take away trailers from residents in need of temporary
housing. See Shaila Dewan, Ready or Not, Katrina Victims Are Losing Temporary Housing.
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A1.
82. Id. Housing advocates for Katrina survivors say that the FEMA solution to the
trailer eviction—providing listings of available rentals and rental assistance—is unable to
meet the housing needs in the market crisis. Associated Press, FEMA to Close 13 PostKatrina Trailer Parks, USA Today, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation
/2007-11-29-fema-trailers_N.htm [hereinafter FEMA to Close]. In response, FEMA officials
defended the move as a step in obtaining a permanent housing shortage for survivors. Id.
“I’m not sure that anyone really thought of these trailers as being their permanent home; I
hope not,” said Ronnie Simpson, a FEMA spokesman. Id.
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move Gulf Coast hurricane victims out of the trailers.83 However,
even as Hurricane Gustav pressed toward New Orleans in August
2008, survivors in FEMA trailers scrambled to find shelter.84
Moreover, the hurricane survivors who have been plagued with
physical illness because of the now-documented formaldehyde
emissions are not entitled to health benefits to cover their medical
costs. Emergency room treatments, new medical expenses, and
chronic complications from the exposure are not covered by the
government.85 For already survivors cash-strapped, additional
medical fees can be catastrophic.86
As one activist noted, “This is not what the citizens of the Gulf
Coast and our country envisioned when, in September, 2005, President Bush pledged from Jackson Square in New Orleans that our
country would ‘do what it takes, and stay as long as it takes’ to rebuild the Gulf Coast.”87
The regulatory gaps noted above demonstrate the inability of
the federal government to respond effectively to emergency housing needs. Furthermore, efforts by FEMA to block a prompt and
effective investigation of the reports evince its willful abandonment of responsibilities. Even the “Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention—generally considered a repository of nonpartisan
scientific expertise—was ‘complicit in giving FEMA precisely what
they wanted’ to suppress the adverse health effects.”88 What are
the chances for meaningful relief for disaster victims when the

83. Leslie Eaton, FEMA Vows New Effort on Trailers Posing Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2008, at A12.
84. As Hurricane Gustav approached, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin expressed concern that the FEMA trailers would be swept up and tossed around in the storm. Mike Carney, Nagin Concerned FEMA Trailers ‘Will Become Projectiles,’ USA Today, Aug. 31, 2008,
http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2008/08/nagin-concerned.html. The push to relocate
people from toxic trailers is, unfortunately, at odds with the harsh reality that affordable,
alternative housing is not being offered to displaced people. See Eaton, supra note 83 (citing
advocates for families who were worried that the sufficient appropriate housing was not
established for displaced trailer residents).
85. Even after finally confirming in February 2008 that many trailers were contaminated with high levels of formaldehyde, FEMA did not offer any financial assistance to trailer residents to cover related medical expenses. Eaton, supra note 82.
86. See William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina: Human and Civil
Rights Left Behind Again, 81 TUL. L. REV. 955, 960 (2007) (noting that a survey of Katrina
survivors in a Houston shelter determined that seventy-two percent of them were not insured).
87. Kromm, supra note 42; see also George W. Bush, President of the United States,
Address to the Nation at Jackson Square in New Orleans, Louisiana (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.usa-patriotism.com/speeches/gwb_katrina915.htm). In his speech to the
nation, the President also invoked the images of Jamestown winters, Chicago after the great
fire, and the San Francisco earthquake to demonstrate the will of the people to bounce back
from nature’s wrath. Id. (“Americans have never left our destiny to the whims of nature—
and we will not start now.”). Ironically, the unnatural disasters associated with the storm
have proven more difficult to overcome.
88. Lawmakers Fault FEMA on Trailers, supra note 73.
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agencies are politicized?89 Clearly, a more predictable, objective
solution is needed to address some of the difficulties that continue
to haunt Katrina survivors.
IV. LITIGATION FAILURES: THE INEFFICACIES
OF THE REMEDIAL RESPONSE
Since Hurricane Katrina, one constant that has emerged is the
inability of remedial efforts to respond effectively to the challenges
presented. As more recent litigation efforts make clear, the judiciary is not equipped to remedy the problem of response. To date,
attempts to address the disaster relief problem through the courts
have proven time consuming, exhausting, and ultimately unsuccessful. Litigation regarding public housing in New Orleans demonstrates the inability of the courts to respond to the government
harms.90 Finally, the recent failure of litigation connected to the
levees failures proves how intractable government immunity can
be.91 The litigation problems connected to the toxicity levels in trailers seems to be just as riddled with difficulties in obtaining
meaningful results.
Plaintiffs affected by formaldehyde levels in FEMA trailers
filed a class-action lawsuit in Louisiana naming the federal government and trailer manufacturers as defendants.92 The suit also
89. The other obvious issue—but beyond the scope of this article—is how the recovery
efforts went so wrong in the first place. Some commentators place the blame on the failure
of the government to anticipate and meet the needs for adequate emergency housing. See
Eaton, supra note 46 (noting that almost three years after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA still
had not responded to Congress’s call to develop shelter for victims of natural disasters).
Many, however, point to plain old capitalism as the driving force behind the move. “In New
Orleans . . . no opportunity for profit was left untapped.” KLEIN, supra note 13, at 411.
Another theory asserts that the biopolitics of disposability may play a role in the government’s neglect that borders on abuse. See Henry Giroux, Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race,
Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability, C. LITERATURE, Summer 2006, at 171, 172-196
(arguing that because Hurricane Katrina disproportionately impacted the poor and people
of color, the systemic hostilities to such groups played themselves out in the willful neglect
and mistreatment of the survivors); see also David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism
Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1159-66 (2008) (identifying localism as the source of the persistent racial and economic fragmentation that cripples New Orleans).
90. The issue of public housing in New Orleans has been particularly volatile, triggering lawsuits, intense charges, and disappointment. Adam Nossiter, In New Orleans, Some
Hope of Taking Back the Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2006, at A22. The fight over the future of public housing has drawn some heavy-hitters into the ring as shelter for twenty
thousand people was at stake, luring bureaucrats, politicians, developers, lawyers, and accidental activists eager to return home. Id.; see also William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity:
Housing that Working and Poor People Can Afford in New Orleans Since Katrina, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 399-408 (2007) (addressing the issue of affordable housing post-Katrina).
91. Cain Burdeau & Michael Kunzelman, Louisiana: Katrina Flooding Lawsuit Dismissed, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 31, 2008, at A6 (discussing a recently dismissed lawsuit over the
levee breaches following Katrina in which a federal court cited the Flood Control Act of 1928,
which shields the government from lawsuits when flood control projects such as levees break).
92. Complaint, Hillard v. United States, 2007 WL 647292 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2007)
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names several travel trailer vendors93 and alleges violation of the
Stafford Act,94 negligence, strict liability in tort, and breaches of
implied and express warranties.95 The plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the defendants from providing FEMA housing, which purportedly violates federal regulations.96 They also seek payments for
alternative housing pending completion of mandatory testing for
suitability; remediation of any defects in housing to bring the formaldehyde emissions to acceptable levels; actual, consequential,
and punitive damages; medical testing and monitoring; and attorney’s fees.97 Based on the barriers confronting plaintiffs in past
storm-related litigation, the plaintiffs’ chances for success in this
case appear remote. FEMA has already requested immunity from
the lawsuits, moving to be dismissed from the cases.98 Moreover,
even if the court ultimately awards damages, litigation will take
years to wind its way through the system. An immediate, dependable alternative is needed now.
V. IMPROVING THE ODDS: ESTABLISHING A TOXIC TRAILER FUND
To date, courts have not been able to meet the needs of Katrina
survivors. Furthermore, legislation has also been entirely unable
to meet the challenges presented by Katrina.99 However, the critical review of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
(“9/11 Fund”) serves as a compelling guide for crafting a solution
for the trailer survivors. Specifically, the factors that led to the
creation of a 9/11 Fund militate in favor of a compensation fund to

(No. 06-2576), 2006 WL 1746461.
93. Id. ¶ 5 (stating that the federal government was “flummoxed” when hundreds of
thousands of its taxpayers were left with uninhabitable homes following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).
94. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, also known
as the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, provides federal assistance to victims of disasters. 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2006). The Act makes FEMA the agency responsible for directing the
coordination of disaster relief assistance. See 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 173 (2006).
95. Complaint, supra note 92.
96. Id. ¶ 64.
97. Id.
98. Associated Press, FEMA Seeks Immunity from Suits over Trailer Fumes, USA Today,
July 22, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-07-22-fema-immunity_n.htm?
loc=interstitialskip (describing FEMA’s arguments that the government should only be liable
if it supervised day-to-day activities of its contractors and that a review of legislative history
demonstrated that Congress intended to bar claims arising from disaster relief).
99. See, e.g., Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, Reconstruction
and Reunion Act of 2005, H.R. 41977, 109th Congress (2005). In fact, some legislation has
erected roadblocks, rather than reparative measures to address housing needs following
Katrina. See Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod & Olympia Duhart, Evaluating Katrina: A Snapshot
of Renters’ Rights Following Disasters, 31 NOVA L. REV. 467, 469-74 (discussing the consanguinity statute passed by St. Bernard Parish following the storm and limiting those eligible
to move into rental housing in the community).
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assist a special class of Katrina survivors—those facing long-term
medical complications caused by government-issued toxic trailers.
The lessons learned from the horrific terror attacks of September 11th100 should not only inform our response to terrorism but
should also inform our view of government’s role in intervention.
Just eleven days after the terrorists’ attacks on commercial airlines that led to deaths at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and a crash at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, President Bush signed
legislation aimed at preserving the viability of the air transportation industry.101 Since the creation of the 9/11 Fund, scholars and
politicians have questioned whether the legislation signaled a revolution in tort-type compensation schemes or the advent of welfare-relief measures.102 On all accounts, the relief provided by the
fund was both compassionate and compelling. The fund provided
money on a no-fault basis to people who would forego tort remedies
against airlines and other would-be defendants—all payable from
the U.S. Treasury.103 Though there are obvious differences between the circumstances that led to the tragedies of 9/11 and those
that led to Hurricane Katrina, the relief offered by the 9/11 Fund
provides a workable framework for rethinking and reconfiguring
the proper role of government intervention following catastrophes.
According to the Final Report of The Special Master for the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, ninety-seven
percent of the deceased victims’ families, who might otherwise
have pursued lawsuits, received compensation through the fund.104
More than $7.049 billion was distributed to survivors of the September 11th attacks.105 The average award for families of victims
exceeded $2 million, and the average award for injured victims
was nearly $400,000.106
In defense of the creation of the fund, the Special Master overseeing the fund distribution advanced the countervailing public
policies served by the fund. The following factors were implicitly
considered in the distribution of the 9/11 Fund: (1) the national
perspective to a unique tragedy; (2) the uniqueness of the circumstances; (3) the need to meet the physical and psychological need for
100. On September 11, 2001, the United States was victim to terrorist attacks that
killed almost three thousand people. Joseph P. Fried, The Grim Accounting of Sept. 11 Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 29.
101. KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj/gov/final_report.pdf.
102. Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 148 (2005).
103. Id. at 137.
104. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 80.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1.
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closure; and (4) the benefit of a prompt and predictable alternative
to litigation.107 These same factors should control as we determine
that a FEMA fund is needed to help storm survivors sickened by
government-issued toxic trailers.
A. National Perspective to a Historic Tragedy
Framing the entire policy argument is the perspective of the
nation to a historic tragedy. Citing the profound and universal response to the day’s events, the Special Master’s report depicted the
September 11 tragedy as a “unique historical event, similar in kind
to the American Civil war, Pearl Harbor and the assassination of
President Kennedy.”108
Hurricane Katrina, the levee breach, and the ensuing flood in
New Orleans and surrounding regions also constitutes a grave and
historic national tragedy. Media coverage of Katrina demonstrates
the extent to which the storm and its aftermath dominated the national spotlight. Indeed, a Pew Research Center’s News Interest
Index rated Katrina as one of the most watched news events of the
past quarter century.109 The high media exposure most likely explains the recalibration of public opinions regarding federal disaster relief.110 Not surprisingly, Americans surveyed following the
storm reported “low confidence in government responsiveness.”111
Almost seven in ten of those surveyed said that the federal government did not consider preparedness a top priority.112 Approximately eight in ten of those surveyed blamed federal government

107. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101. In his report, Special Master Kenneth R.
Feinberg expressly rejected the establishment of a similar act modeled after the Sept. 11
Fund. Id. at 83 (arguing that absent an attack like September 11th, no program should be
established to deal with another terrorist attack).
108. Id. at 80.
109. PAUL C. LIGHT, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, THE KAEFFECT
ON
AMERICAN
PREPAREDNESS
1
(2008),
available
at
TRINA
https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/postkatrina_preparedness.pdf. According to
the Center, seventy percent of Americans were closely following Katrina, placing it closely
behind the Challenger accident and the September 11th attacks. Id. Notwithstanding the
significant media coverage dedicated to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, some community activists are working to counter the relatively low media attention given to the toxic
trailers. Derrick Evans, a school teacher and Mississippi native who heads the Gulf Coast
Peoples’ Movement for Full and Fair Recovery, has been driving his thirty-two foot FEMA
trailer—dubbed the KatrinaRitaVille Express—around the country to raise awareness
about the toxic trailers and failed recovery efforts in the Gulf. Amon, supra note 47.
110. A survey of Americans pre- and post-Katrina makes the point. The Robert F.
Wagner School of Public Service and the University’s Center for Catastrophe Preparedness
and Response (CCPR) surveyed 1,506 Americans four weeks before Katrina hit and 1,004
Americans five weeks after the storm. LIGHT, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Id. at 4. (“The federal government was rated as largely unprepared for three specific scenarios: terrorist bombings, hurricanes and floods, and a flu epidemic.”)
112. Id. at 5.
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failures on disorganization and mismanagement.113 The national
perception of government failures is not only warranted but
cemented by the federal government’s refusal to implement curative measures to protect the people it put in harm’s way.
B. Uniqueness of the Circumstances
A major terrorist attack on American soil stunned people
around the globe.114 One autumn morning, more than 3,000 people
died as terrorists left an indelible mark on Americans everywhere.115 The events of 9/11 were tragic, but not unprecedented.
Terrorist attacks also occurred on American soil in the twentieth
century.116 However, the enormity of the loss of life suffered in a
single incident and the unimaginable circumstances surrounding
the attack convinced the 9/11 fund representatives that the circumstances of September 11, 2001 were different.117
Similarly, the uniqueness of the Hurricane Katrina storm and
its aftermath created special circumstances for toxic trailer residents. While hurricanes are commonplace in New Orleans,118 the
gravity of the storm, combined with the ensuing flooding caused by
the levee breach, was most unusual.119 The key element in the
drowning of New Orleans was not a natural disaster; rather it was
the levee failures bred from bad engineering and misplaced priorities that sank the city.120
Moreover, as was true of the 9/11 Fund, a relatively small class
of people would benefit from the proposed Toxic Trailer fund, as
long as that beneficiary group is narrowly defined to include those
individuals who were (1) affected by Hurricane Katrina,121 (2)
113. Id.
114. See DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR 246-47 (2008).
115. Fried, supra note 100.
116. The Oklahoma City Bombing took place in 1995. GARDNER, supra note 114, at 260.
117. “What happened in September 11, 2001 was—for most of us—as startling and incomprehensible as the appearance of a second moon in the sky.” GARDNER, supra note 114,
at 246.
118. Several storms routinely move through the Southeast region of the United States
during the Atlantic “hurricane season,” which is June 1 through November 30. Tropical
Cyclone Climatology, National Weather Service, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastprofile.shtml
(last visited June 13, 2009).
119. In addition to the loss of human life, the level of physical destruction in Hurricane
Katrina was unprecedented. It was easily the most costly natural disaster in U.S. history as
direct damage is estimated to be around $80 billion. GARDNER, supra note 114, at 260. Insured losses are cited at $41.1 billion. Prada, supra note 14.
120. Michael Grunwald, The Threatening Storm, TIME, Aug. 13, 2007, at 28.
121. Survivors of Hurricane Rita, who also received FEMA trailers after surviving a
hurricane, would be similarly situated and subject to the same relief. See FEMA Accused of
Twisting Science in Report on Trailer Danger, CNN, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/POLITICS/01/29/fema.trailers/index.html (noting the 150,000 households who have
lived in FEMA trailers at some point since Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita). While
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moved into temporary housing by FEMA, (3) exposed to formaldehyde in their trailers, and (4) suffered injury or death.122 Since one
of the 9/11 factors is limiting relief to a discrete class of people who
are uniquely situated,123 the Toxic Trailer Fund would satisfy that
criterion. Fairness demands that innocent victims of natural disaster
compounded by government mistreatment be offered financial support to help pay for the inevitable medical complications ahead.124
C. The Physical and Psychological Needs for Closure
The need for closure and a chance to move toward renewal play
a central role in the consideration of relief.125 The physical and
psychological wounds of both 9/11 and Katrina will be extremely
difficult to mend. First, the scope of the terrorist attacks of 9/11
made the horror almost insurmountable.126 Additionally, the televised attacks were so horrific “it was as if we had watched everything through the living-room window.”127 In addition to the physical and psychological tests facing people near the explosions, the
vivid (and sometimes live) images of the disaster on television had
the ability to psychologically affect people far removed from
the scene.128
The same traits apply to the Katrina victims. As observed by
pundits, politicians, and public intellectuals, Katrina and its aftermath created a nearly endless source of tension and abandonment in the public eye.129 For those personally impacted by KatriKatrina survivors are the topic of this paper, the proposed Toxic Trailer Fund would be
available to anyone who qualifies under the enumerated factors and has suffered medical
complications due to tainted trailers distributed by the government. This would obviously
apply to Hurricane Rita survivors struggling with the same toxic trailer troubles. See Editorial, Our view on Disaster Relief: Toxic Trailers for Hurricane Victims? Heckuva job, FEMA, USA Today, Aug. 2, 2007, http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/08/post-2.html.
122. As an analogue, the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund is limited to individuals who
were present at the crash site and suffered physical injury or death. Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 402(5), 402(7), 115 Stat. 230,
237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40129 (2006)).
123. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 79 (defending the Fund’s exclusion of victims
of other terrorist attacks in Oklahoma City and Kenya).
124. In his defense of the establishment of a Katrina Fund, Professor Mitch Crusto
points out that “[i]t would be unconscionable and plainly inequitable to treat Katrina victims with less sympathy and financial support than the September 11 victims.” Crusto,
supra note 15, at 362.
125. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.
126. The attacks of September 11, which saw terrorist takeovers of American commercial
airplanes almost simultaneously in three locations, were the country’s worst terrorist event.
127. GARDNER, supra note 114, at 247.
128. Id.
129. See generally, Troutt, supra note 16 (a provocative collection of essays about Hurricane Katrina written by black intellectuals); WHEN THE LEVEES BROKE (HBO Films 2006)
(a documentary detailing the travails of Katrina survivors by preeminent black movie director Spike Lee).
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na, the displacement was profound.130 The storm physically displaced and dispersed survivors throughout the nation.131 More
than three years after the storm, Katrina survivors still suffer daily from its effects. With the long-term health side-effects caused by
toxicity levels in their trailers, survivors will no doubt continue to
deal with the physical difficulties left behind in the storm’s wake.
For other people who were safe from the storm’s physical reach,
ubiquitous media coverage had another effect. Compelling television images of an American city under siege made the tragedy very
real for people far removed geographically from the storm. The
Congressional hearings held over the toxic trailers shocked even
the most practiced cynics. Representative Henry Waxman, a California Democratic and Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, said the nearly five thousand pages of
documents reviewed in connection with the toxic FEMA trailers
exposed “an official policy of premeditated ignorance.”132
It is no surprise, then, that the abandonment felt by many
storm survivors following the hurricane is pervasive.133 Even FEMA’s efforts to accelerate trailers relocations have left survivors
stranded and confused. Faced with a choice between a poisonous
trailer and homelessness, many survivors do not know what to
do.134 Congress has exposed the distribution of the toxic trailers135
and must now fashion an appropriate remedy to address the problem.136 FEMA’s delay in addressing the toxic trailers “spawned
130. See Troutt, supra note 16, at 3-27.
131. See FREY, SINGER & PARK, supra note 9, at 22.
132. Gilbert Cruz, Grilling FEMA Over Its Toxic Trailers, TIME, July 19, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1645312,00.html. Representative Waxman
said FEMA’s attitude was “sickening.” Id. FEMA waited almost a year and a half after the
first complaint and on the eve of a congressional hearing to act. Id. A federal toxicologist
also testified at a House Science and Technology subcommittee hearing in April that the
CDC, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and FEMA manipulated scientific research to minimize the health risks facing residents of the trailers. Associated Press,
Did CDC Stifle Toxic FEMA Trailer Alerts?, CBS News, Apr. 1, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2008/04/01/health/main3987944.shtml.
133. Before the last relocation push over the toxic trailers, FEMA’s earlier mishandling
of the relocation of Katrina survivors was likened to something out of a Kafka novel. Editorial, Kafka and Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A14 (citing a federal judge’s assessment of FEMA’s aid application process as being so convoluted and confusing that it
was unconstitutional).
134. Shaila Dewan, Holdouts Test Aid’s Limitations as FEMA Shuts a Trailer Park,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A1 (detailing the official closing day of the Renaissance Village
trailer park, which once housed about six hundred families displaced by Katrina). The transitional housing—rent vouchers—is sometimes out of reach for survivors because of technical ineligibilities. Id.
135. The revelation came after congressional hearings and reports by whistle-blowers
that FEMA had suppressed evidence of the toxic trailers. Rick Jervis & Andrea Stone,
FEMA to Step up Trailer Relocations, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 2008, at 3A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-14-toxic-trailers_N.htm.
136. Like the paradigm adopted for the 9/11 Victim Fund, a special master should be
appointed to craft appropriate distribution amounts for eligible recipients. See FARBER &
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fresh outrage” over the government’s completely failed response to
Katrina.137 After so many years, the survivors—as well as the public—deserve closure.
D. Prompt and Predictable Alternative to Litigation
The last feature of the 9/11 Fund that supports the creation of
an analogous Toxic Trailer Fund is the absolute necessity of creating a prompt and predictable alternative to litigation. Although
9/11 victims had the option of pursuing tort damages against the
airline industry, more than ninety-seven percent of the families
voluntarily sought relief through the 9/11 Fund.138 Special Master
Kenneth Feinberg cites the extraordinary, proactive steps taken by
the fund to keep claimants informed regarding their options.139 For
many victims, the transparency and predictability of the 9/11 Fund
outweighed the risks, uncertainty, and delays connected to litigation.
The same calculus is likely to appeal to Katrina survivors moving out of toxic trailers but still facing long-term medical fees. To
date, efforts to achieve justice for Katrina survivors in the courts
have not been successful. Court challenges have presented substantial hurdles for litigants. First, sovereign immunity generally
protects government agencies from liability.140 Second, a stalled
and fragmented court system has made it practically impossible
for litigants to succeed in the courts.141 And finally, litigants are
likely to face serious difficulty in showing the nexus between formaldehyde-laced trailers and subsequent medical problems. For
many of the Katrina survivors, the expense and expertise required
to pursue such a claim in court is simply beyond reach.142 FurCHEN, supra note 15, at 317-19. The U.S. Attorney General appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg
as the Special Master for the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund on Nov. 26, 2001. FEINBERG
ET AL., supra note 101, at 4. The Special Master promulgated any necessary procedural and
substantive rules and determined eligibility from the fund. Id. at 3.
137. Catharine Skipp, Toxic Trailers: Hurricane Katrina’s Victims Cope with Yet
Another Ordeal—Unhealthy Residences Provided by Uncle Sam, Newsweek, Feb. 16, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/112828/output/print.
138. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.
139. Id. For example, walk-in offices were opened in New York and Washington, D.C.
just fourteen weeks after the tragedy, a toll-free information telephone line was established
to answer questions, thirty-three separate mass mailings were made to potential claimants,
a website was updated more than 830 times, and a non-adversarial hearing process was
established. Id. at 5-15.
140. See Tarak Anada, The Perfect Storm, an Imperfect Response, and a Sovereign
Shield: Can Hurricane Katrina Victims Bring Negligence Claims Against the Government?
35 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 305-10 (2008) (analyzing the difficulties Katrina claimants face in
bringing negligence claims against the government).
141. See Douglas L. Colbert, Professional Responsibility in Crisis, 51 HOW. L.J. 677,
681 (2008).
142. Professor Crusto notes that “Katrina [survivors] . . . are not in a financial position
to wait for possible assistance following protracted litigation.” Crusto, supra note 15, at 362.
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thermore, meeting the immediate physical needs of the recipients
would likely mitigate the health risks that the formaldehyde
exposure creates.
Like the 9/11 Fund recipients who were compensated for both
economic and noneconomic harms,143 the trailer fund recipients
should be offered compensation for both economic and noneconomic losses. The 9/11 Fund statutory definition of noneconomic losses included, but was not limited to, losses for physical and
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of
life.144 Such an expansive definition of non-pecuniary losses will
allow potential claimants under the Toxic Trailer Fund to receive
full compensation for the massive scope of their losses.
The creation of a Toxic Trailer Fund is the best alternative to
help compensate survivors for the losses caused by their exposure
to toxic trailers.145 It would also serve communitarian needs by offering relief for noneconomic harms that impact recipients of
toxic trailers.146
VI. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES
The opponents of a Toxic Trailer Fund are likely to raise several potential arguments. However, each of these concerns
can be adequately addressed through a commitment to
government accountability.147
The first counter-argument will most likely be premised on the
notion that the government has no affirmative duty to provide for
its citizens. Challengers will likely assert that since the federal
Constitution creates no positive rights, there is no mandate for a
government-sponsored recovery fund. Nevertheless, scholars and
advocates have long challenged the presumption that American
143. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 4.
144. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §
402(5), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40129 (2006)).
The statute prohibited the award of punitive damages. Id. § 405(b)(5).
145. One of the most common side effects of exposure to formaldehyde is worsened respiratory health. See Spake, supra note 44. The majority of 9/11 survivors who received
payouts from the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund were for asthma and other respiratory
problems. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 101, at 56. Almost fifty-two percent of the claims
were these illnesses. Id. at 56.
146. Ackerman, supra note 102, at 142 (arguing that the September 11th Fund
represents one way “the legal response to tragedy can reflect our compassion” by developing
“a sense of shared history and construct community”).
147. The existence of criticisms, even legitimate challenges to a trailer fund, should not
foreclose the possibility of all government relief. Even the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was not above criticism. See, e.g., Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of
the Special Master: Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2006) (criticizing the September 11th victim Compensation Fund of 2001).
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citizens are not entitled to positive protection by its government.148
Furthermore, an argument against affirmative duties also fails to
recognize the special needs created by compounded harms.
One way to reconsider government responsibility in disaster relief
is to strengthen legislation that imposes clear, affirmative duties on
the federal government to respond. Absent a disturbance in the swell
of constitutional jurisprudence that refuses to acknowledge any positive rights in the Fourteenth Amendment,149 there must be a reconfiguration through legislative channels to honor the social contract.150
Toxic Trailer Fund opponents may also contend that the financial burden is too high on an already-strained government and
that the floodgates will be open for a list of assistance funds to cover long-term medical fees associated with natural disasters. However, adherence to the 9/11 Fund factors in the analysis described
above will restrict, rather than expand, the class of people to whom
a relief fund would be available. A commitment to the factors that
guided the 9/11 Fund will meet the needs of those uniquely situated while guarding against an open door for people with less
egregious injuries.
Critics of the establishment of a Toxic Trailer Fund may also
argue that people should be responsible for their own well-being. A
quick survey following initial reports of the toxic trailers suggests
that at least some people are tired of what they perceive as an endless litany of “government handouts.” Yet good government contemplates a responsibility for others, especially those who are unable to protect themselves.151 This value is a sentiment gaining
momentum among both politicians152 and the public,153 especially
148. See, e.g., Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 224 (2006)
(challenging the Rehnquist’s Court’s limiting view of the 14th Amendment as ahistorical).
149. In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
creates no positive rights in the constitution. Deshaney v. Winnebago Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Such a limitation relieves the government of any affirmative duties to prevent due process violations and concomitantly limits the relief available to citizens
harmed by government inaction. See Duhart, supra note 14, at 422. Ideally, in a postKatrina, post-Deshaney world, the Supreme Court would reconfigure the limit on affirmative duties and act accordingly.
150. See Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81
CHI. KENT L. REV. 1127, 1170 (2006).
151. “We are more compassionate than a government that . . . sits on its hands while a
major American city drowns before our eyes.” President Barack Obama, Acceptance Speech at
the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/08/28/us/politics/28text-obama.html?.
152. See generally Representative Keith Ellison, Address at the Midwestern People of Color
Legal Scholarship Conference (May 30, 2008) (calling for a turn to the politics of generosity).
153. “Not only did our government fail to answer the call of its most vulnerable citizens
during that fateful period; it still fails each and every day to rebuild, redeem and rescue
those who are ignored because of their poverty, their race, their passage into old age.” Walter Mosley, Shouting Under Water, THE NATION, Aug. 23, 2007, at 18; see also Editorial,
Tough Choices Ahead: Paying for Katrina Relief, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2005, at L4 (not-
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in the wake of various government bailout programs during the
current economic hardships.154 Unlike other bailout programs
sponsored by the government to rescue corporate collapse, the Toxic Trailer Fund recipients can show a direct correlation to government activity: the distribution of formaldehyde-laced trailers.
Finally, the most effective response to opponents of a special
fund is rooted in the principles of American government. The creation of a medical fund to assist hurricane survivors who lived in
toxic trailers will bolster the central democratic value of government accountability in two important ways. First, establishing
such a fund incentivizes the implementation of more stringent
safety regulations. Second, it demonstrates a commitment to redress for government harms. The contract of citizenship is constitutionally and statutorily defined, but “much of it is a tacit understanding that citizens have about what to expect from
their government.”155
VII. CONCLUSION
The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina require governmental response. The challenge is to reach consensus on framing
the relief. This relief requires the creation of a Toxic Trailer Fund
under the paradigm adopted to formulate a proper remedy for the
victims of 9/11.
Toxic trailers create immediate physical and psychological
risks. They also create long-term medical problems that are not
now covered by the government. As Hurricane Katrina survivors
from New Orleans and elsewhere struggle to make their return
home after years of neglect and mistreatment, the government
must strive to meet basic accountability standards.156 It is particuing that a poll following the storm showed that recovery on the Gulf Coast was a top priority
for the country).
154. Nelson D. Schwartz, A History of Public Aid During Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7,
2008, at A27. The recent efforts to provide financial assistance to big business are not new.
Id. For several decades, Washington has bailed out several corporations, including military
contractor Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the Penn Central Railroad, Chrysler, and Bear
Stearns. Id.
155. Ignatieff, supra note 10, at 15. James Perry, Executive Director of the Greater
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, renewed the call for government aid at the Democratic National Convention in Denver, Colorado in August 2008. Press Release, Greater
New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., Fair Housing Director to Address Democratic Convention at Denver Roundtable (Aug. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (“We’ve made great progress
but are far from recovery. As Gulf Coast advocates and citizens we call on America to honor
President Bush’s commitment to rebuild New Orleans and the American Gulf Coast in a
manner that is ‘even better and stronger than before the storms.’ ”).
156. Editorial, Katrina One Year After, THE NATION, Sept. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060918/editorshttp://www.thenation.com/doc/2006918/editors/
print?rel=nofollow (“This is the United States, a country that has . . . abandoned the Gulf
Coast to the social Darwinism of the corporate banditi. It isn’t because we’ve lost the ability
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larly important to meet these needs in this disaster-prone era.157
Considering the same factors that emerged from the 9/11 Fund—
the national perspective, the uniqueness of the circumstances, the
need for physical and psychological closure, and the prompt and
predictable alternative to litigation—the federal government
should establish a relief fund for toxic trailer residents.
The people who survived Katrina have already tested their
luck against hurricane winds, torrential rains, and flood waters.
Rather than assist them in their time of need, the government has
complicated and exacerbated their harms.158 People who have lost
nearly everything—homes, personal belongings, and those invaluable intangibles such as community and familiarity—should not be
denied government assistance. Unless the law imposes a duty to
recalibrate its recognition of harm, survivors who have weathered
a storm and toxic trailers will continue to face a high-stakes gamble in their search for relief. We must improve their odds.

to care. It’s because we’ve left behind something larger than New Orleans: our notion of
collective social responsibility.”).
157. The rise in natural disasters also raises the bar for the law to meet new challenges
in crafting effective responses. See generally FARBER & CHEN, supra note 15, at 317-19. In
addition, the recent increase in infrastructure failures also challenge the government to
develop better safety standards to prevent such harms and to develop creative response to
remedy victims harmed by such tragedies. Kevin Diaz, I-35W Bridge Tragedy May Yield
New Rules, StarTribune.com, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/

34454549.html?elr=KArksi8D3PE7_8yc+D#aiU (discussing the oversight and design failures
of the I-35W bridge collapse in Minnesota in August 2007 that killed thirteen people and injured another 145).
158. See NOAM CHOMSKY, The Bush Administration During Hurricane Season, in IN147, 149 (2007) (“Lost in the flood is a concern for the needs of cities and for
human services.”).
TERVENTIONS

